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While the Indian rupee is claimed to be a `market determined ex-
change rate', there is a gulf between the de facto and de jure exchange
rate regime. An examination of the data reveals that India has a de
facto rupee-dollar pegged exchange rate. From the early 1990s on-
wards, as India as reintegrated with the world economy, the implemen-
tation of this pegged exchange rate has induced increasing monetary
policy distortions. The volatility of the rupee-dollar rate has sub-
stantial variation which have considerable implications for economic
agents in understanding currency risk and monetary policy. However
these changes in course have not been preceded by announcements
from RBI.
This is a draft version of the paper which went on to appear as India's currency regime
and its consequences, in Economic and Political Weekly, March 2007.
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2Since 1993, India's currency regime is said to be a managed oat, a \market
determined exchange rate" in the sense that there is a currency market and
the exchange rate is not visibly administratively determined. However, RBI
actively trades on the market, with the stated goal of \containing volatility",
and inuencing the exchange rate.
A distinction between the de jure currency regime - as claimed by a central
bank - and the de facto currency regime - that is actually in operation - has
been established in the literature. Many countries that claim to oat, have a
\fear of oating" (Calvo and Reinhart, 2002). This suggests an investigation
into the Indian rupee.
1 What is the INR currency regime?
A currency regime is classied as a de facto peg when the volatility of the
exchange rate against one currency is very low, owing to trading by the cen-
tral bank. Reinhart and Rogo (2004) identify the Indian currency regime
over 1979-2001 as a \peg to the US dollar". Calvo and Reinhart (2002) pro-
pose a metric of currency exibility that combines volatility of the exchange
rate, volatility of reserves and interest rate volatility. The intuition of their
measure is that when the central bank tries to set the exchange rate, this will
require greater reserves volatility and greater interest rate volatility. Their
calculations suggest that currency exibility in India has not changed in the
1979-1999 period. This evidence is extended till 2003 in Patnaik (2003) with
the same result. These results suggest that de facto currency regime in India
did not change after 1979.
Figure 1 shows ve years of three INR exchange rates, where all three cross-
currency rates are re-indexed to the same starting value (of the INR/USD).
While the INR/USD has some small changes, basically it has been unchanged
over substantial periods of time, while other INR rates have moved signi-
cantly.
Table 1 for cross-currency volatilities, adapted from Patnaik (2003), high-
lights the phenomenon of pegging. The INR/USD has the lowest volatility of
a range of cross-currency rates.1 In the extreme case, if the INR/USD were
a xed rate, INR/JPY volatility would be exactly the same as USD/JPY
volatility, since every change in the USD/JPY rate would yield an identi-
1The series was extended backwards in the period prior to the introduction of the Euro
using the Deutsche Mark.


































Table 1 Cross-currency volatility (daily returns, 4/1993 - 1/2007)
USD GBP EUR JPY
INR 0.291 0.575 0.663 0.738
USD 0.508 0.606 0.697
GBP 0.465 0.721
EUR 0.705









































cal change in the INR/JPY rate. The table shows INR/JPY volatility - of
0.738% per day - is close to the USD-JPY volatility of 0.697%. Similarly,
INR-EUR volatility of 0.663% per day is a lot like USD-EUR volatility of
0.606%. Finally, INR-GBP volatility at 0.575% per day is close to USD-GBP
volatility of 0.508%. Indeed, INR exchange rates other than the INR/USD
have volatilities like the other oating-rate currency pairs in the table. These
are characteristics of a de facto INR/USD pegged exchange rate. The INR
is pegged to the USD, and thereby oats with respect to all other currencies.
Figure 2 focuses on the recent period, with a `moving window' estimator of
currency volatility. In the months where the INR/USD was tightly pegged,
INR/EUR volatility was the same as EUR/USD volatility. To the extent that
there is a divergence between INR/EUR volatility and EUR/USD volatility,
this conveys the extent to which the INR is not pegged to the USD.
One of the best tools for inferring the currency regime in operation based
on currency market data is based on a regression.2 An independent cur-
rency, such as the Swiss Franc (CHF), is chosen as an arbitrary `numeraire'.
Exchange rate time-series are re-expressed as daily returns, i.e. log price
dierences, and the following regression is estimated:
2This approach was made prominent by Frankel and Wei (1994), but has been invented
several times before, going back atleast to Haldane and Hall (1991). Also see Benassy-
Quere and Coeure (2003).
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As an example, rUSD
CHF
is the one-day returns on the USD-CHF exchange
rate. Interpretation of the estimates falls into the following categories:
Fixed If India runs a xed exchange rate to the USD, then every uctuation in
the INR/CHF rate merely reects a uctuation in the USD/CHF rate. The
regression yields 2 = 1, 3 = 4 = 5 =  = 0 and R2 = 1.
Floating A oating rate is characterised by high values of  and a low R2.
A oating rate does not mean that  = 0. If (say) Japan is important in
trade and nancial transactions, the JPY will be signicant. The coecients
reect the true trade and nancial linkages present in the economy.
Pegged Under a pegged INR/USD rate, we see 2 = 1, and near-zero values for
3;4;5. The size of , and the regression R2, convey how tight the peg
is. Low values of , and hence high values of the R2, are associated with
a less exible exchange rate. If a basket peg is in operation, the regression
will show the weights of the USD, the JPY and the EUR in the basket.
Through this, evidence can be obtained about the de facto currency regime
in a period of interest. It also oers a mechanism for monitoring the currency
regime, so as to know about changes in the tightness of a peg and the identity
of the currency or basket of currencies against which pegging is done.
Table 2 applies this model in a few interesting situations. These serve as
examples of the regression approach to characteristing currency regimes. In
addition, they generate international comparisons which help give us a cross-
country perspective for thinking about the INR currency regime.
1. The rst example is that of the Chinese yuan in the xed exchange-rate
period. The USD coecient is 1, with an enormous t statistic of 2665.7.
All other coecients are 0. The residual standard deviation is just 0.007,
and the R2 is 99.99%. This shows us what the regression estimates look like
when faced with a xed exchange rate.
China announced that from 22 July 2005 onwards, the Chinese Yuan would
no longer be a xed exchange rate, but would instead be pegged to a basket
of currencies. While this may be the stated de jure situation, de facto there
6Table 2 The currency regime as seen through regression estimates
Country & period USD JPY EUR GBP  R2
Evolution of the Chinese currency regime
28 Sep 1998 1.000 0.0001 0.0004 0.0001 0.007 0.9999
to 21 Jul 2005 (2665.7) (0.4) (0.4) (0.3)
22 Jul 2005 0.9975 0.0076 -0.0144 -0.0080 0.0590 0.9894
to 31 Dec 2006 (132.0) (1.0) (-0.6) (-0.7)
Pre-crisis Korea
1 Jan 1981 0.9981 0.0004 -0.0127 0.0081 0.1232 0.9757
to 1 Jan 1996 (286.0) (0.1) (-1.5) (1.7)
Post-reforms India
1 April 1993 0.9560 0.0286 0.0522 0.0213 0.2904 0.8411
to 31 Dec 2006 (88.2) (3.6) (2.2) (1.6)
Post-reforms Korea
1 Jan 2000 0.7323 0.2530 -0.0295 0.0771 0.4317 0.6789
to 31 Dec 2006 (32.1) (13.1) (-0.6) (2.7)
Floating rates, all 1/1/2000 - 31/12/2006
Brazilian Real 0.8254 0.1063 0.4504 0.1126 0.9808 0.3208
(15.9) (2.4) (4.0) (1.7)
New Zealand Dollar 0.2076 0.1471 0.5294 0.2639 0.6345 0.2516
(6.2) (5.2) (7.2) (6.2)
South African Rand 0.2060 0.1714 0.5814 0.2740 1.0240 0.1268
(3.8) (3.7) (4.9) (4.0)
7is a USD peg. As the table shows the coecient of the USD barely moved {
from 1 to 0.9975, the coecents of all other currencies remain insignicant,
and the R2 is still at 0.9894. There is no evidence in favour of a basket peg;
it is a simple USD peg.
2. The pre-crisis Korean Won was tightly pegged to the USD. After the crisis,
the t statistic of the USD dropped from 286.0 to 32.1, reecting an important
reform in the currency regime. The Japanese yen has become very important
in uctuations of the Won under the new regime. This reects trade and
nancial linkages between Korea and Japan. The  rose from 0.123 to
0.4317 and the R2 dropped from 97.57% to 67.89%, but the Won is not yet
a oating rate.
3. The Indian rupee appears to be pegged to the USD. At the same time, the
JPY and the EUR do seem to aect the rupee. The R2 of the regression
is 84.11%, thus leaving little space for any other factors in determination of
the nominal exchange rate.
4. Finally, the table has New Zealand, Brazil and South Africa, over a common
seven-year period. The symptoms of oating seen in the regression are:
statistical signicance of multiple currencies, a high  and a low R2. The
coecients seen on the regression, with a oating exchange rate, reect the
country composition of trade and nance - as an example, the USD has an
important coecient for the Brazilian Real. For the South African Rand,
which is a oating rate, we see that the coecients of all currencies are
signicant and the R2 is extremely low at 0.12. The coecient of 0.58
for the Euro shows the importance of Europe in South Africa's trade and
nance.
2 Implications of a pegged currency
A key insight of open economy macroeconomics, which has come to promi-
nence in recent decades, is the idea of the `impossible trinity' (Mundell,
1961). This consists of the assertion that no country can simultaneously
have an open capital account, a xed exchange rate, and monetary policy in-
dependence. Specically, once the capital account is open, and the exchange
rate is xed, monetary policy is solely driven by the need to uphold the xed
exchange rate.
As an example, suppose a central bank embarks on tight monetary policy
when there is a xed exchange rate and no capital controls. Tight monetary
policy gives higher interest rates, which attract capital inows. The central
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bank has to buy foreign currency in order to prevent appreciation. This gives
higher money supply, which frustrates the attempt at having tight monetary
policy. Few countries today have xed exchange rates. However, trying to
`manage' an exchange rate yields similar conicts. When an exchange rate
target is suciently important, the attempt to force a desired price on the
currency market can lead to a loss of monetary policy.
As Fischer (2006) points out, during the 1990s many economies were strug-
gling to control or stabilize ination. A pegged exchange rate was a tool for
controlling ination. The process of liberalisation of trade and capital ows
then generated an impossible combination, and a series of nancial crises
erupted around the world.
In the Indian case, a system of strong capital controls backed by FERA was
present at the outset. This made it possible to have a pegged exchange rate
and monetary policy autonomy over the 1973-1993 period. In the decade of
the 1990s, restrictions on the current account and the capital account were
substantially, through not completely, eased.
Figure 3 and 4 show quarterly data for gross inows on the current account,
gross outows on the current account, and net capital inows over the last ve
years. The dramatic growth of these ows suggests an increasing openness
on the capital account. As a consequence, the size of trades that RBI is
required to place on the currency market, in enforcing the peg, has become
bigger over time (Figure 5).
India does not have a completely open capital account, nor does India have a
xed exchange rate. Patnaik (2005) shows that there was a loss of monetary
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policy autonomy in the 1990s.
As an example, in 1998, when local business cycle conditions were weak,
the pegged exchange rate led to a tight monetary policy. Conversely, in the
period after 2002, when local business cycle conditions were buoyant, the
pegged exchange rate led to monetary expansion and accelerating ination.
The currency regime is now a central issue in understanding monetary policy
and capital ows (Shah and Patnaik, 2007).
3 Time variation in currency exibility
While the INR currency regime has overall been de facto pegged to the USD,
the extent of pegging has varied signicantly through this period.
Figure 6 shows a `moving window' estimate of INR/USD volatility. The scale
of this graph runs from values like 0.1% per week to values like 1% per week
- a range of 10:1. There have been multi-month periods where the INR/USD
exchange rate was xed, but there have also been periods where the volatility
of the INR/USD was closer to that of the INR/EUR or the INR/JPY.
These changes in currency exibility have not been preceded by announce-
ments from RBI. Currency exibility has risen and dropped without this
information being transparently shared with economic agents. This informa-
tion matters directly to economic agents with currency exposure, who need
forecasts of currency volatility for making decisions on currency hedging.
In addition, complexities of implementation of the currency regime are now
11of central importance in understanding monetary policy and capital ows.
Given this lack of transparency at RBI, monitoring and understanding Indian
macroeconomics requires an ongoing process where the ideas and methods
of this paper are applied in inferring the de facto currency regime from the
data.
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